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ON THE NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF
AN OBJECT WITH CREATIVE POWER
Charles J. Klein

I present an argument which is related to the ontological argument which has
a more plausible premise and a weaker conclusion. I assume two postulates
concerning the meaning of 'x creates y'. I then prove that the proposition possibly, something (non-vacuously) creates everything entails, in quantified 55, that
there is a necessarily existing object with creative power - an object which creates all (and some) contingently existing objects in some possible world.

Theism is often thought to embody the claim that:
(A)

There is a being that is causally responsible for the existence of
everything.

Like many traditional descriptions of God, A can be given interpretations
according to which it is trivially false. In the following, I will give an interpretation of A that is minimally generous and such that possibly A has intuitive appeaJ. I will then show informally that possibly A entails, in quantified 55, that there is a necessarily existing object that is possibly the creator
of everything, although, so far as the derivation goes, he may actually be
the creator of nothing.
It will simplify what follows to employ the usual symbolism of quantified modal logic. I will use the following abbreviations:
ENX iff df D3y(x=y)1 (x necessarily exists)
Ecx iffdf 3y(x=y) 1\ - D3y(x=y) (x contingently exists)
Also, we will say that x creates y just in case x is causally responsible for the
existence of y. Now it is difficult to see how anything could be causally
responsible for the existence of itself, or how anything could be causally
responsible for the existence of a necessarily existing object. So I adopt the
following postulates concerning the meaning of IX creates y':
(PI) Necessarily, for all x, it is not the case that x creates x.
(P2) Necessarily, for all x and for all y, if x creates y, then EcY.
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With the intention to give a plausible interpretation of the thesis that something creates everything, we might take this to mean that something creates everything that contingently exists, since by P2, it is impossible that
something create anything that necessarily exists. So:
(B)

Something creates every x such that Ecx.

If, contrary to our suspicion, there are some necessarily existing objects but
no contingently existing objects, then B will be true. Every necessarily existing object will be a vacuous creator. It will be causally responsible for the
existence of all, that is, none, of the contingently existing objects. So let us
consider a stronger hypothesis, that there is a non-vacuous creator:
(C)

Something creates every x such that Ecx, and there is an x such
that Ecx.

I recommend C as a minimally generous interpretation of A. More formally, C can be expressed as follows:
(C I )

::3 x[(z)(Ecz -+ x creates z) /\::3 y(EcY)]

Let F be the property defined by:
[(z)(Ecz -+ x creates z) /\ ::3y(EcY)]
This could be read as the property of being an x such that x creates ali, and some,
contingently existing objects. Let 0 be some object that satisfies Fx. Now suppose that EcO. It then follows by C I that 0 creates 0, in violation of postulate PI" Relative to the class of objects that actually exist, the properties EC
and E\I are contradictories. So since EcO is false, ENO is true - 0 necessarily
exists.
We have derived that anything that satisfies Fx also satisfies ENX. C 1
asserts that something satisfies Fx. So C I implies:

Since we have assumed that it is necessarily true that nothing creates itself
(PI) we can conclude that C I strictly implies C2 • Simplifying C I to '3 xFx', we
have:

Now assume that it is possible that there be a non-vacuous creator. That is,
assume OC lt or:

The following schema is universally valid in S5:

NECESSARY EXISTENCE AND CREATIVE POWER
(5)
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(OP AD(P ---+ Q» --+ OQ

Substituting '::3xFx' for 'P' and '::3x(ENx A Fx)' for 'Q', we can derive 0::3 x(ENx
A Fx) from the resulting instance of 5, together with C3 and C4• So:

If we eliminate the abbreviation 'EN' from Cs we get:

In any model for quantified 55 in which C6 is true, there is some possible
world w, accessible to the actual world, in which some object 0 satisfies
the predicates ::3 y(x=y) and Fx. So 0 is F in wand something is identical
to 0 in any world accessible to w. Given that accessibility is an equivalence
relation in any 55 model, it follows that there is something identical to 0 in
every world accessible to the actual world, and that 0 is F in some world
accessible to the actual world. So C6 entails:

(C 7) ::3 x(D::3 y(y=x) A OFx)
From the hypothesis that there could be something that non-vacuously creates every contingently existing thing, we have derived that there is a necessarily existing object with creative power, though it is consistent with our
premises that this object be perfectly idle in the actual world.
There remains a sense, however, in which this argument constitutes of
proof of the existence of God. Consider a theist who knows that following
proposition is true:
(C 8 ) Necessarily, no necessary existent, other than God, can be
causally responsible for the existence of something.
I assume that it is an implicit tenet of Christian theology that there are no
necessary beings with causal power, other than God. Given that the
Christian can know that Cs is true, he may correctly speak of the object
whose existence is established by the foregoing argument as God.
Consequently, an atheist who accepts the conclusion of the argument may
be said, in sense, to have come to believe in the existence of God: He
believes that there exists a certain object of which it is true that x=God. In a
more common sense, he does not believe in God. He does not believe that
there is an x such that x=God. So it may seem that such conversion to theism is trivial. An atheist who knows me well enough to believe anything I
say with a certain seriousness might accept my assertion that:
The object that I am currently contemplating, exists.
If this object is God, then the atheist has come to believe that there exists a
certain x which, unknown to him, is God. But the result of accepting the
conclusion of the foregoing argument is more significant. Whereas the
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property of being the object I am currently contemplating contingently applies
to God, the property of being a necessary being with creative power2 is, in
virtue of (C R), a logically individuating property of God. God necessarily
possesses it, and nothing else could possibly possess it. The atheist who
accepts C 7 has the belief that there is an x which has a certain property,
where this property is one which is necessarily coextensive with the one
expressed by 'x is God'. To compel belief in God in this sense is perhaps
the most that we can expect from considerations of logic and conceivability
that are completely abstracted from matters of faith.

University of Virginia
NOTES

1. The quantifiers here and throughout are 'actualist'. When sentences
employing them are evaluated with respect to some world w, their range is all
and only those individuals that exist in w. When there is no explicit relativization to a possible world, their range is all and only those individuals that exist
in the actual world. An individual constant denotes the same object irrespective of the world at which a sentence containing that constant is evaluated. I
use lower case Roman letters for variables, and '0' as the only individual constant.
2. This is the property expressed by the predicate formed by dropping the
initial quantifier from C7.

